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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of the need for a U.S. Naval presence in Southeast Asia.
With the rapid changes in the world geopolitical order following the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1989, the need for American military presence in all parts of the world is being
reexamined. This thesis exanmnes the most recent policy and strategy statements of both
the President and the Pentagon and how Southeast Asia might fit in to this new strategy.
U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia are reevaluated for the post-Cold War era,
concluding that the United States does indeed have strong interests, primarily economic,
in the region. There are several potential threats to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, both
internal and external to the region. The internal threats are the traditional rivalries within
the region. Potential external threats are from China and Japan seeking regional
hegemony. A strong U.S. naval presence will be superior to any regional navy and is
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EXECUTIVE BU)UIARY
"U.S. Naval Presence in Southeast Asia:
Is it Necessary?"
LT Todd A. Gunerman, USN
September, 1993
This thesis examines the need for a continued Naval presence
in Southeast Asia in light of the end of the Cold-War. The
hypothesis is that there is in fact a definite need for a
continued Naval presence in the region by the United States.
The U.S. Navy has an historical role in protecting U.S.
interests in Asia dating back over one hundred years. Beginning
with Admiral Perry's opening of Japan and the rescue of American
citizens in China during the Boxer Rebellion and continuing
through the Cold War and the conflict in Vietnam, the Navy has
played a crucial role in preserving and protecting American
interests in this part of the world.
The dawn of the post-Cold War era has necessarily resulted
in a rethinking of the national military strategy. "The National
Military Strategy" released by the Pentagon in 1992 outlines a
new vision for the military's role in this new climate. The
Navy's "From the Sea...", released the same year defines the
Navy's role in the new strategy. This thesis analyzes the Navy's
role in Southeast Asia under this new strategy. The regional
emphasis in the new strategy stresses the importance of regional
security vice the global nature of the Cold War. Southeast Asia,
due to its maritime nature, is one particular region where the
Navy will have an important role. Forward Presence and Crisis
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Response, two of the four pillars in the new military strategy
are particularly well suited to the Navy in Southeast Asia.
A reassessment of American interests in Southeast Asia is
necessary. In order to justify a military presence in a region
the United States must have strong national interests that need
protecting. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest growing
economic regions in the world and the United States has a large
stake in those economies. The region is also situated astride
the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to our allies Japan and
Korea. As our largest overseas trading partner, Japan's economic
security is vital to our economic security. It is vital to the
United States to keep these strategic sea lanes open.
American political interests in Southeast Asia have also
changed. Containing communism is no longer our primary goal in
the region. Promoting democracy, free markets, and human rights
are now the primary U.S. political interests in the region.
Much progress is being made in these areas. Regional stability
is crucial for continued progress. A strong U.S. Naval presence
can ensure that stability.
Recognizing threats to American interests in Southeast Asia
is important in order to prevent those threats from harming U.S.
interests. Though the region is generally peaceful and currently
prosperous, there are deeply embedded historical animosities that
could pose a future threat. Various territorial disputes and
instability in Cambodia and Burma should be closely monitored.
U.S. Naval presence can provide stability and dampen any naritime
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disputes that may threaten our interests.
The rise of a regional hegemon potentially unfriendly to
the United States is another major threat. A drastic withdrawal
of American military presence can greatly increase the
possibility of this.
The formation of a protectionist regional trade bloc that
excludes the United States could do great harm to U.S. economic
interests in the region. Demonstrating our commitment to the
region through a strong Naval presence greatly diminishes the
chances of this happening.
A strong naval presence in Southeast Asia is important for
protecting American interests in the region. The question of how
much presence is enough is difficult to answer. The loss of the
bases in the Philippines further complicates the issue of
maintaining a presence. However, even without these bases the
U.S. 7th Fleet is by far the dominant naval force in the region.
Its withdrawal could spark a destabilizing naval arms race. The
United States has definite national interests in Southeast Asia
and maintaining stability there is important to protecting those
interests. A strong presence by the U.S. Navy can maintain
stability there, and it is therefore in America's interest to
maintain its naval presence in Southeast Asia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. HYPOTHESIS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The record of the United States in Southeast Asia provides
ample evidence that the Navy has been essential for the
protection of the national interest in that part of the world.
It is the hypothesis of this paper that, just as a U.S. Naval
presence in Southeast Asia has been important to protecting
the national interest in the past, a continued naval presence
there is essential to protecting those interests today and
into the future.
First I will examine the new national military strategy
and the Navy's role in that strategy and demonstrate how it
may be applied to Southeast Asia. Does the new strategy, as
articulated by the Pentagon and the Bush administration,
address our interests and security concerns in Southeast Asia?
Second, I will reassess the US's interests in Southeast
Asia. The end of the Cold-War has necessarily caused us to
rethink our interests in every part of the world. We no
longer need massive troop strength in Europe to deter a Soviet
assault. We no longer need to support or entice anti-
communist insurgencies in Central America, Africa, or Central
Asia. We no longer need to hold massive military exercises in
the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or the Indian Ocean.
Do we still need the 7th Fleet in Southeast Asia? What are
American interests in this part of the world and what is
necessary to protect them?
Third, after establishing what American interests are in
Southeast Asia, I will examine the possible threats to those
interests. There are potential threats both internal and
external to the region. There are potential threats both
military and economic. Before determining what type and how
much American military presence is necessary it is essential
to understand what the possible threats are.
Finally, I will address the problem of what type and how
much of a military presence is necessary to protect American
interests in Southeast Asia. Recent changes in the region
that have affected American military presence and how to cope
with those changes will be taken into account.
B. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NAVY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
It is to Manila that we owe the ability to send troops and
ships to the defense of our ministers, our missionaries,
our consuls, and our merchants in China, instead of being
compelled to leave our citizens to the casual protection
of other powers, as would have been unavoidable had we
flung the Philippines away.1 Secretary of State John Hay,
1900
The rescue of these citizens by American military forces is
but one example of the historical importance of the U.S. Navy
in Southeast Asia.
1 Thomas J. McCormick, "China Market", Chicago, 1967, p. 163
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1. Pro Cold-War
The U.S. Navy has a long history in the Western
Pacific. The navy has protected national interests in Asia
and at times advanced them. Commodore Perry's opening of
Japan in 1853 and Commodore Dewey's defeat of the Spanish
fleet in Manila Bay in 1898 are the two most prominent
examples. The prying open of the China market by the western
powers, and the U.S. Navy's role in protecting American
interests in the affair, around the turn of the century
provides another example.
The revolution in American naval strategy, heavily
influenced by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, was
reflected by U.S. naval operations in the Western Pacific in
the latter half of the 19th century. The repudiation of the
traditional American naval strategy of coastal defense and
commerce raiding gave way to a navy based on the battleship
designed to engage an enemy on the high seas. Mahan argued
that a nation could only be great if it maintained a navy
powerful enough to control the seas in the face of any
adversary.
As the United States emerged from its isolation on the
North American continent and became a world class trading
nation and military power, its navy played an important role.
Protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs), prying open new
markets, and protecting American citizens abroad were all
roles played by the navy. The U.S. fleet in the Philippines,
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secured by the victory over the Spanish, proved indispensable
to American interests in the Pacific.
2. Cold-War
During the Cold War Southeast Asia became a focus of
the American policy of containment. Preventing insurgent
forces from toppling friendly governments one by one was seen
as vital to U.S. interests. Though the U.S. eventually
committed large numbers of ground troops to the conflict in
Vietnam, the containment policy originally called for the U.S.
to supply only naval and air power, with our allies in the
area supplying the brunt of the ground troops. In the post-
Vietnam era U.S. policy reverted to this concept. Secretary
of the Navy John Lehman sought to expand the containment
policy from fighting any communist aggression on the ground to
maintaining enough naval presence in the western Pacific to
destroy the Soviet fleet at its origin in Vladivostok. 2 This
large naval presence would also serve to deter any Soviet de-
stabilization efforts in Southeast Asia.
After Containment, the other primary role the U.S.
Navy has had in Southeast Asia is keeping the sea lanes to the
Middle East free of obstruction. This is not vital only to
the U.S. directly but also indirectly through Japan's and
South Korea's near total dependence on Persian Gulf oil. In
2 Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia: The
Future Military Presence", Asian Survey, Vol. 31, no. 7 (July
1991) 663
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this context the U.S. role in the area has been described as
one of "denial and reassurance" in order to keep the sea lanes
to the Middle East open. 3 Put more plainly, U.S. objectives
were to deny any other power naval dominance in the area, and
to reassure both our allies in Southeast Asia and those
dependent on the security of the region that those sea lanes
will remain unobstructed. The entire cold-war strategy in the
Asia-Pacific was essentially a continuation of Mahanian
concepts with the aircraft carrier replacing the battleship as
the fleet's centerpiece.
C. POST COLD WAR CHALLENGES
Southeast Asia will be associated with the Vietnam War in
the minds of Americans for generations to come. Since the
final withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country in 1975
Southeast Asia has not been in the forefront of U.S. foreign
policy debate. With the end of the Cold War and the apparent
lack of a major threat to U.S. security, Southeast Asian
issues arr. considered even less frequently. However, the
United States does have national interests in the area. With
the major changes in the world orde~r of the last four years
(1989-1993)it is time to rethink what our interests in
3 William J. Crowe Jr. and Alan D. Romberg, "Rethinking
Pacific Security", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, no.2 (Spring 1991)
p. 136
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Southeast Asia are and what policies should be pursued to
protect those interests.
With U.S. military presence in the western Pacific
destined to be reduced and the complete absence of the Soviet
navy, new focus is being placed on the ASEAN nations
(Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore,
and Brunei) ability to maintain stability on the peninsula and
surrounding islands known as South East Asia. To be sure, the
non-ASEAN nations of the area (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and
Burma) will be just as critical to stability, but at least for
now ASEAN is the preferred instrumentality to fill the
potential vacuum left by a U.S. departure.
There are reasons for both optimism and concern for the
future of the region. on the plus side democratic
institutions appear to be taking hold. The Philippines just
held peaceful elections (May 1992). The fairness of those
elections is debatable but given the past history of elections
there,democracy is making progress. Thailand, traditionally
one of the more stable countries in the region, was successful
in ousting the military regime installed by coup in 1992 and
now has a legitimate democratically elected civilian
government. Thailand's future looks bright. Malaysia and
Singapore have the oldest democratic institutions in the
region. Though the political systems there are dominated by
single parties leaving voters with little real choice at
elections, they do enjoy a large degree of popularity and
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legitimacy with their populations. Even Vietnam has some
cause for optimism. The government there has indicated it
would like to be integrated into the local community of
nations, and probably will be if economic reforms are
successful.
That brings us to the negatives. The Cambodian problem
illuminates ASEAN's chief weakness - its lack of military
strength exemplified by their inability to stop Vietnam's
invasion of its neighbor. Despite its withdrawal from
Cambodia and recent friendly overtures, Vietnam is still
suspected by some of its neighbors of harboring long-term
ambitions of regional hegemony. Despite their ASEAN
membership, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand are
economic and potential military rivals.4 Thailand felt so
threatened by Vietnam that it was willing to turn to China to
ensure its own security if ASEAN or the U.S. could not provide
it. 5 The governments of Burma, Vietnam, and Laos prove that
authoritarianism is not dead in the region yet. Finally, the
ongoing dispute over the Spratly Islands threatens to flare
into a major conflict possibly involving the Chinese.
What do the nations of Southeast Asia themselves want for
their future? The primary goals of ASEAN for the 90's include
the resolution of local conflicts and the extrication of
4 Crowe and Romberg, p.124
5 Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990's", Asian
Survey, Vol. 29, no.6 (June 1989) 592
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outside actors. 6  A Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) is envisioned if outside forces (mostly American) can
be removed without creating a vacuum. Malaysia and Indonesia
are the primary proponents of a Nuclear Free Weapons Zone
(NFWZ) and elimination of all foreign bases in the area. 7
However ASEAN's chief concern is the creation of a power
vacuum caused by an abrupt American withdrawal from the area
that might be filled by an ambitious China, Japan or India.
Until ASEAN can provide for their own military security they
still favor a U.S. presence in the area. The problem is no
one wants to play host. U.S. bases in the Philippines were
viewed as a breach of sovereignty, a continuation of
colonialism, and an embarrassment. 8 With the closing of the
bases in the Philippines reality has overcome vanity and
Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia have all offered U.S.






II. U.S. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA
On August 2, 1990 President Bush gave a speech in Aspen,
Colorado articulating a new national security strategy for the
United States in the post-Cold War era. It was later codified
in the National Security Strategy of the United States. Gen.
Colin Powell in January 1992 issued his vision for the
military's role in this new strategy in National Military
Strategy of the United States.
A. THE NEW NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE NAVY
The new strategy is based on four pillars; Strategic
deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and
reconstitution. 9 The new strategy recognizes the decline of
the global communist threat and shifts the focus to regional
threats. It also recognizes the United States' unique
position as a trusted world leader that seeks neither
territory, hegemony, or empire. The document also
specifically articulates the US's national interests, in order
of importance, as; l)the survival of the US as a free and
independent nation, 2)a healthy and growing US economy,
3)maintenance of healthy and cooperative relations with
friends and allies, and 4)a stable and secure world, where
9 National Military Strategy of the United States, 1992, US
Government Printing Office, Washington DC, pp. 6-7
9
freedom, human rights, and democracy can flourish.1 0 Although
it would be a stretch to envision Southeast Asia ever becoming
a threat to the survival of the US, it is not difficult to see
the importance of the region in regards to a healthy and
growing US economy. As economic interests are secondary only
to the survival of the nation, Southeast Asia can indeed be
considered very important to the national interest. Regarding
the other interests on the list, the US is on friendly terms
with most Southeast Asian nations (except Vietnam and Burma),
and has formal alliances with two (Thailand and the
Philippines). Democratic institutions are accepted as ideals
throughout most of the region, and though there are human
rights concerns in some areas, there have been improvements as
economies flourish.
In switching from a global to a regional focus the new
strategy emphasizes the new threat as the unknown and the
uncertain. Regional instability must be prevented but it is
difficult to predict where or in what form instability will
arise. Southeast Asia, except for Cambodia, is a relatively
peaceful region. It is difficult to predict with any degree
of certainty when and where instability will arise, but a
strong US presence there can do much to maintain stability.
In the absence of a strong and trusted outside presence, it is
probable a destabilizing arms race would ensue. This coupled
10 ibid, p. 5
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with some of the age-old antagonisms in the region could
easily lead to conflict.1 1
Regarding the Western Pacific specifically, the region is
referred to as an economic miracle and America's principle
overseas trading area. Due to the maritime character of the
area, US forces there should be primarily maritime.' 2
The Navy will play a key role in carrying out much of this
new strategy, particularly in a maritime region such as
Southeast Asia. The question is does Southeast Asia contain
vital national interests to the US that merit a strong naval
presence? If the answer is yes, as is here hypothesized, then
it is important to understand how the Navy can be used to
carry out the new strategy.
Two of the four pillars, Forward Presence and Crisis
Response, are tailor made for the Navy in Southeast Asia. In
the past, forward presence of US forces has served to avert
crises and prevent war, show commitment and lend credibility
to our alliances, enhance regional stability, provide crisis
response capability, and promote US influence and access.
These are all traditional roles of the Navy and will continue
to be under the new strategy. Crisis response entails the
ability to respond rapidly to an unforeseen crisis in order to
deter a threat and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or in
11 possibilities include China and Vietnam over the
Spratlys, and Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah
12 ibid, p. 22
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a combined effort. In Southeast Asia this could range
anywhere from protecting American nationals caught in a local
crisis to using overwhelming force to defeat a regional
aggressor. The lack of permanent US ground forces or air
bases in the region leaves the Navy as the only force
available to carry out the crisis response element of the
strategy.
B. "FROM THE SEA...": THE NAVY'S ROLE IN THE NEW STRATEGY
"From the Sea..." is a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper
that defines a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps
under the new national military strategy. It attempts to
define the Navy's role under the new strategy. It's main
tenet is to redefine the Navy's role away from open-ocean
warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from
the sea. Recognizing the demise of the Soviet threat and the
shift to a regional focus, the White Paper redefines the Navy
in its traditional, pre-Cold War roles. Statements directly
from the document include:
Our forces can help to shape the future in ways favorable
to our interests by underpinning our alliances, precluding
threats, and helping to preserve the strategic position we
won with the end of the Cold War.
American Naval Forces provide powerful yet unobtrusive
presence; strategic deterrence; control of the seas;
extended and continuous on-scene crisis response; project
precise power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger
scale warfighting scenarios emerge.
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The Navy...projects a positive American image, builds
foundations for viable coalitions, enhances diplomatic
contacts, reassures friends, and demonstrates U.S. power
and resolve.
Operating forward, Naval Forces demonstrate United States
commitment overseas and promote American interests.
Naval Forces can help provide the Nation's leaders with a
full range of options to preserve regional balances, lay
the foundations for coalition operations, provide
assistance to Americans in danger, respond to crises of
every type, and project decisive power ashore in conflict.
Statements such as these could have been lifted directly from the
American naval strategy of the late nineteenth century. Today,
they are very applicable to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. In
this dynamic and prosperous region of the globe the U.S faces much
uncertainty. The economic potential of the region is huge with a
potential market greater than that of Europe, yet there is no
organized security structure such as NATO in Southeast Asia. The
U.S. 7th Fleet is the most formidable power in the region and can
do much to maintain stability and further American interests.
Forward presence, threat deterrence, reassuring allies, coalition
building, and protecting American citizens abroad, the classic
naval missions described in "From the Sea...", are all directly
applicable to the current situation and our interests in Southeast
Asia.
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III. REASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Now that the danger of a global holocaust inherent in the Cold
War is over, U.S. national interests can be focused on economic
prosperity. Two assumptions must be made here; First, the ultimate
goal for the United States is to maximize the long-run welfare of
its people as measured by an ever-increasing standard of living.
Second, a liberal international economic system, i.e. "free trade"
is economically beneficial to all who participate. If the two
assumptions are not accepted, than there is no need for a military
presence anywhere except on our own national borders.
Secondary interests might include spreading democracy, human
rights issues, and preserving the environment. But these are
ultimately linked to the primary interest of an increasing standard
of living. Only when people's basic needs are met and they begin
to enjoy some prosperity will their attention focus on political
liberalization, environmental issues, etc.... The entire Cold War
was fought on the premise that democratic, peaceful, market
oriented systems simply work better than the totalitarian, Marxist
system. After seventy years this premise has been proven
sufficiently for all to see. East Asia has provided the best
example, for when Asian per capita incomes passed Russian incomes,
after starting from a point far behind Russia, the lesson of which
system is better became clear.
14
If it is agreed that the primary focus of the U.S. national
interest is focused on economics than our foreign policy should
concentrate on protecting our economic interests. No longer will
America be forced to weigh ideological interests versus economic
interests when choosing which governments to support, which
dictators to prop up, or which wars to fight. Now the equation is
simple. If the U.S. has an economic interest in a region or a
particular nation, than policy should be made to protect that
interest. No longer will the U.S. have to support a renegade
dictator or illegitimate government solely because it represents a
stand against communism. If U.S. interests are primarily economic
than it follows that peace in any particular area is in the U.S.'s
best interest since there cannot be general prosperity without it.
The end of the Cold War also necessitates a redefinition of
strategic interests. Strategic interests no longer are based on
containing politically or defeating militarily a hostile
superpower. They too are now linked to economics. Maintaining
freedom of the seas in crucial trade areas, keeping trade routes
open, and maintaining military presence, basing facilities, and
staging areas in or near regions that are economically important to
the U.S. now fall into the realm of strategic interests. A strong
presence in an economically important area is a traditional role
for the Navy and should become its primary role in the post-Cold
War era.
15
A. STRATEGIC INTERESTS: SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Maintaining open sea lines of communication to parts of the
world vital to the U.S. has long been an important role for the
Navy. Trade routes with our trading partners in both Europe and
Asia are vital to the U.S.. The ocean routes to the Persian Gulf
are vital to the entire industrialized world. Japan, our largest
overseas trading partner, is heavily dependent on the oil from the
Persian Gulf that passes through the Strait of Malacca.
i. Oil and the Strait of Malacca
In the case of Southeast Asia regional peace and prosperity
are in the best interest of the U.S. not only because cf economic
interests intrinsic to the area, but because of the sea lanes to
the Middle East. In this regard U.S. interests are just as vital
as before The end of the Cold War. Japan and South Korea are still
heavily dependent on Persian Gulf Oil and U.S. economic
interdependence with these two nations has increased. A portion of
U.S. oil also passes through the Strait of Malacca and the South
China Sea (astride the Spratly and Paracel Islands). It is vital
to U.S. national interests to keep these sea lanes open. The Navy
is ideally suited to, and is indeed the only force capable of, such
a mission.
2. Projecting Power in the Middle East
The U.S. still would find military installations in the
region very useful in the event of another conflict in the Persian
Gulf. Stretching supply lines all the way to Pearl Harbor would
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lengthen reaction time to a Middle East crisis and make sustaining
any action there that much more difficult. Any ships deployed in
Southeast Asian waters could respond to a crisis in the Gulf twice
as fast as ships that would have to come all the way from the U.S.
west coast.
Related to our interests in the Middle East, Southeast Asia
can, and has been, used as a staging area for direct military
operations in the Middle East. More specifically, U.S. bases in
the Philippines were used to resupply U.N. forces during the Gulf
war. The Philippine bases have been essential to carrying out all
of our policies in Southeast Asia, from waging the Vietnam War, to
maintaining the naval strength to make the Lehman Doctrine
plausible, to providing a deterrent to any instability in the
region.
B. ECONOMIC INTERESTS: TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND FREEDOM OF
COMMERCE AND COMMUNICATION
Contemporary American trade with Southeast Asia (Table I) is
quite sizable, falling somewhere between trade with Korea and trade
with Japan. ASEAN as a group is the U.S.'s fifth largest trade
partner. 13
13 US Department of State Dispatch, Vol.3, No. 31, August 3,
1992
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TABLE I. U.S. TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA,
1991 (source: IMF, Direction of Trade
Statistics Yearbook)
Exports Imports










BE Asia 20,820 30,349
E.C. 103,120 89,432
Japan 48,147 95,010
S. Korea 15,518 17,742
What is more revealing is a comparison of the Qrowth rates of trade
between the U.S. and Japan (our largest trading partner excepting
Canada) and the U.S. and Southeast Asia. Trade with Southeast Asia
is growing more rapidly then trade with Japan (Table II).14
14 Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund,
1992
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TABLE I1. U.S. TRADE GROWTH RATES 1986-1991
6 year
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 growth
US Exports/SEA 5.9% 16.1 28.2 25.5 18.1 9.7 156%
US Exports/Japan 18.8 5.1 33.2 18.5 8.9 -0.1 113%
US Imports/SEA -2.8 18.9 21.3 18.7 9.9 6.1 94%
US Imports/Japan 18.1 3.1 5.7 4.3 -4.2 2.1 31%
With a population roughly equal that of western Europe, Southeast
Asian trade has the potential to equal that of Europe's in the not
to distant future. Our trade with ASEAN already exceeds our trade
with Germany, and we export more to Singapore than to Spain or
Italy. 15
In addition to direct trade with the region, U.S. business has
a large amount of investment in Southeast Asian countries and this
also is growing (Table III). Related to this U.S. investment are
American nationals currently living in Southeast Asia, and
protecting them is a primary responsibility of the U.S.
15 Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and
Agricultural Affairs, in an address before the ASEAN post-
ministerial conference, Manila, July 1992
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TABLE III. U.S. DIRECT INVESTXENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1990 1991 % change
Indonesia 3,226 3,458 +7.2
Malaysia 1,384 1,440 +4.0
Philippines 1,629 1,672 +2.6
Singapore 3,385 4,313 +27.1
Thailand 1,585 1,787 +12.7
Total 11,209 12,670 +13
Japan 20,997 22,918 +9.1
government. Again, this is a traditional role for the Navy and it
is ideally suited for such a mission.
C. POLITICAL INTERESTS
The dominant political interest of the U.S. in Southeast Asia
during the Cold War was the prevention of the rise to power of
communist regimes. We often protected or promoted corrupt,
authoritarian regimes that only maintained the thinnest veneer of
democracy, usually only to placate American critics, as long as
they represented a stand against communism. As the ideological
threat from the Soviet Union, the PRC, and Vietnam has subsided the
U.S. can now take a new look at promoting true democracy and
protecting human rights throughout the region.
As stated by President Bush in his Aspen speech, "a stable
and secure world, where freedom, human rights, and democracy can
flourish", is in the national interest. Note that he did not say
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freedom, democracy, and human rights are necessary for a stable and
secure world. The statement implies that stability and security
are necessary prerequisites to democracy and human rights. It may
even suggest that democracy and respect for human rights will
follow naturally. This however cannot be assumed as automatic.
Therefore, U.S. policy should be first to pursue stability and
security, and only then can democratic ideals be emphasized. In
such a world it is easy to see how the U.S. (as well as the rest of
the world) would benefit. Historically, it seems that democracies
embrace free-market capitalist economics, do not attack their
neighbors, and generally respect basic human rights. Military
spending could be greatly reduced, and general peace and prosperity
would ensue. The question is how do we reach such a utopia?
If such a world is ever to be realized, the democratic
foundations must come from within states. It cannot, and should
not be imposed from the outside. The key, as President Bush
implied, is stability. Political development is assisted by
stability because it allows regimes to institute political reforms
without the fear of external threats. Instability caused by
external threats often leads to the repression of reforms and makes
it all to easy to declare a "state of emergency", martial law, or
direct military rule. Violations of human rights are common under
such conditions.
In Southeast Asia a strong U.S. military presence contributes
to regional stability. The presence of the U.S. Navy discourages
a spiraling naval arms race that would probably follow a U.S.
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withdrawal. Such an arms race would necessarily stunt economic
development thus harming American economic interests, not to
mention the damage to economic assets that would result from a
military conflict. The United States in its past has never shown
any inclination to use its military as and excuse for a pax
Americana in Southeast Asia. On the other hand U.S. presence
deters the rise of any other regional hegemon, such as China or
Japan, that may be perceived as a threat by the U.S. or Southeast
Asia. If Southeast Asian nations felt militarily vulnerable, as a
result of an abrupt U.S. withdrawal, their governments could easily
justify harsh measures at home as necessary to fend off external
threats. Political liberalization is much more difficult in an
unstable environment. Promotion of democracy, freedom, and human
rights are not a means to an end. Rather they are the byproduct of
stability. A strong U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asia can
provide the stability necessary for democratic ideals to flourish.
If the Thai military could have pointed to a legitimate external
threat as justification maintaining power after their most recent
coup, they may still be in power today. They could make no such
pretense and today Thailand is under civilian democratic rule. The
harsh m2 li.ary government in Burma, with no legitimate external
threats to point to, cannot justify themselves to their own people.
Without such a unifying factor SLORC (the ruling group of military
men in Burma) may eventually be forced to give way to the
legitimately elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.
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These are but two examples. It cannot be known what the
state of demc- -acy would be in Southeast Asia if not for the
stabilizing presence of the U.S. military, but it would certainly
not be as advanced as it is today. What is known is that stability
has allowed the region to achieve phenomenal economic success and
with it substantial political development.
The political and economic development of Southeast Asia does
directly serve U.S. national interests because the more advanced
countries are likely to be more cooperative politically and useful
economically through reciprocal trade and investment. The presence
of the U.S. Navy as a stabilizing force will enhance the further
political development of the region.
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IV. THREATS TO AMERICAN INTERESTS
It is clear that the United States has important interests in
Southeast Asia and those interests must be protected. Before
determining the best way to protect those interests it is important
to recognize and understand what are the possible threats to those
interests.
Relative to other regions of the world Southeast Asia is a
peaceful and prosperous area. However there are several potential
threats to today's stability. Among these are territorial disputes
between countries in the region, the Spratly Islands being the most
visible and potentially dangerous. The factional conflict in
Cambodia is threatening to flare up again. The very prosperity
that makes Southeast Asia the economic success story that it is
could lead to military rivalry both within the region and also
among larger powers desiring to have more influence in the region.
Both China and India are undergoing a large naval expansion and
modernization programs.
One look at a map makes obvious the significance of these
developments to Southeast Asia. Certainly the rise of a regional
hegemon potentially unfriendly to the United States would be a very
serious threat to our national interests in Southeast Asia. China
and India are the two leading candidates for this role and a U.S.
military withdrawal would only encourage them. A military buildup
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by the other regional power, Japan, would also lead to instability
though Japan is less likely to be hostile to the United States.
A. TRADITIONAL RIVALRIES AND ANIMOSITIES
1. Colonial Era: Artificial Borders and the Rise of
Nationalism
Southeast Asia's location midway between India and China led
directly to the colonial powers heavy influence in the region.
This colonial influence was the catalyst for the numerous and
complex ethnic and racial rivalries in Southeast Asia today. The
artificial borders established by the European colonial powers of
the 1800's (Britain, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain)
often disregarded coherent ethnic groupings. Laos is a prime
example: the French fused together a conglomeration of diverse
"states" in order to form a buffer between their rich colonies
among the Vietnamese to the east, and the expansionist Siamese and
British in Burma to the West. Today, more ethnic Laotians can be
found in what is now Thailand than in Laos itself. 16  The
populations of most of the Southeast Asian nations are extremely
diverse as opposed to a homogenous population such as Japan's.
The melding of these diverse populations into distinct states
by the colonial powers gave rise to the nationalism that flared
after WWII. The war showed for the first time to Southeast Asians
16 Kenneth J. Conboy, "Conflict Potential in Southeast Asia
and the South China Sea", The Heritage Lectures, The Heritage
Foundation, Washington D.C., 1992, p. 1
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an Asian power militarily defeating the strongest of the West,
instantly shattering the myth of Western invincibility. The boost
this event gave to fledgling nationalist movements helped them to
resist the re-colonization of the region after the war. Also as a
result of the war several borders were moved that still are the
cause of conflict today. For example the French shifted the border
between Cambodia and Vietnam along the Mekong Delta, putting a
large number of ethnic Cambodians under the control of Vietnamese-
dominated Cochin China. This border dispute is still problematic.
2. Cold War Era: Conflicts of Ideology
By the middle of the 1950's the anti-colonial struggle gave
way to ideological and power struggles that characterized the Cold
War. Many of the traditional animosities in Southeast Asia were
relaxed in favor of cooperation between politically like-minded
groups. The Cambodian Khmer Rouge and the Laotian Pathet Lao put
aside their traditional hatred for the Vietnamese to cooperate with
Hanoi against the Americans and their allies.
While ideology was for the first time the primary cause of
conflict in Southeast Asia, traditional territorial disputes and
ethnic tensions had by no means disappeared. Some examples
include:
"* The Konfrontasi between Malaysia and Indonesia caused by
Indonesian claims of sovereignty over portions of Malaysia and
Singapore.
"* Manila, claiming control over the Malaysian state of Sabah,
supports a guerrilla movement in Malaysia.
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* Border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand in the early
1960s over a border temple at Preah Vihear.
"* Armed conflict between China and South Vietnam in January 1974
over the Paracel IslandsCambodian nationalist extremists
massacre Vietnamese civilians in Phnom Penh in 1970 in the
wake of a military coup.
"* Anti-Vietnamese insurgency by hill tribe minorities within
Vietnam claiming ethnic discrimination by lowland Vietnamese. 17
The end of the Vietnam war marked the return of the traditional
sources of conflict to primacy. The bioody conflict between the
Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge was seated in the deep ethnic
animosity that predates the arrival of the Europeans. The
resulting decade long Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is a
primary cause of Cambodia's troubles today.
3. Vietnam Watershed: Return of Traditional Rivalries
Today there are two forms of conflict that exist in Southeast
Asia. First, there are numerous small insurgencies throughout the
region, some of which are no longer grounded in the Communism of
the Cold War. Economic growth resulting in relatively content
populations, and without their superpower patrons, the remaining
communist insurgents in the region are not much of a threat.
Communist and other internal insurgencies have little chance of
expanding across borders and will have little effect on regional
stability.
Cambodia has the most explosive internal problems although the
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 has greatly reduced the
17 Conboy, p. 2
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chances for this situation to spill over into a wider conflict.
While peace in Cambodia remains elusive it is now a problem for
Cambodians and the UN to solve.
Other insurgencies in Southeast Asia include: 18
* Burma: Burma's ethnically one-dimensional illegitimate
government has resulted in this highly fragmented ethnic
nation dissolving into numerous guerrilla forces. None of
them have much chance of gaining widespread support and yet
the government has little chance of suppressing them.
* The Philippines: The Philippines still has significantly large
economically based insurgencies. However it is split into
different factions with little hope of ousting the government.
If economic reforms take hold the Communist's chances will be
further diminished.
• Laos: Laos, one of two remaining communist states in Southeast
Asia, has several anti-communist insurgencies underway.
Lacking foreign support they have little chance of succeeding.
Indonesia: Indonesia faces ongoing insurgencies in Aceh, East
Timor, and Irian Jaya. These are ethnically based and so far
the Indonesian military has been able to control them easily.
The second, and more serious, prospect for instability in
Southeast Asia involves territorial disputes. The dispute over the
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is the most serious and will
be discussed in the section on China. Other territorial disputes
include:
Vietnam and Cambodia: Agreements signed between Hanoi and the
Vietnamese-installed Cambodian government in 1985 ceded parts of
Cambodian territory to Vietnam. Several islands and a large piece
18 Conboy, p. 4
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of traditionally Cambodian territory near the city of Svay Rieng
remain in Vietnamese hands. Three of the four factions, including
the Khmer Rouge, vying for power in Cambodia today have called for
the cancellation of the agreements. 19 As long as Vietnam continues
to claim this territory, border conflict with Cambodia will
continue.
Indonesia and Malaysia: The Konfrontasi of the early 1960's was the
start of a border dispute between these two countries that is
dormant today but has potential for future conflict. Two islands
located east of Borneo are claimed by both countries. Both sides
agreed in 1988 to maintain the status quo on the islands until a
peaceful agreement can be reached. In the summer of 1991, however,
Malaysia began to develop one of the islands apparently in
violation of the agreement. Jakarta has protested but maintains
the dispute will not jeopardise friendly relations with Malaysia.
Malaysia and the Philippines: Both nations claim ownership of parts
of the Malaysian state of Sabah in eastern Borneo. In 1968
Philippine President Marcos authorized a secret guerilla war
against the Malaysian government in Sabah. Before the plot could
be launched it was uncovered much to the embarrassment of Manila.
Since then both sides have remained steadfast in their claim to the
territory. Since Sabah is firmly under Malaysian control and the
19 Conboy, p. 5
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Philippines lack the means and probably the will to do anything
about it, this dispute will probably remain a war of words.
Gulf of Thailand: Four countries claim Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) extending 200 nautical miles that overlap each other. If
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, or Cambodia ever attempt to enforce
these EEZs with naval patrols tensions in the Gulf could rise
considerably.
B. RISE OF A REGIONAL HEGEMON
Amidst the transformation taking place in international
relations, it is useful to bear in mind that US interests in
Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two
centuries: commercial access to the reqion; freedom of
navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic
power or coalition. 20
1. Japan
Since Japan's defeat in WWII the United States has been a
major keeper of peace in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile both Japan and
the U.S. have built up considerable economic interests in the
region as the individual nations have grown and modernized. The
Navy and the Air Force have already withdrawn from the Philippines
and the possibility of further military reductions in the western
Pacific is being debated. There is much talk of a "power vacuum"
being created if the U.S. withdraws completely and there is a fear
that Japan will remilitarize to fill that vacuum. Images of the
20 "A strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim", Report
to Congress 1992, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
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Imperial Japanese Army swarming through the jungles of Southeast
Asia are still imprinted on many people's memories. Even if Japan
does not remilitarize they are accused by many of seeking to
dominate Southeast Asia economically at everyone elses, including
Southeast Asia's, expense.
Determining precisely what Japan is trying to achieve in its
relations with the ASEAN nations is important if the U.S. is to
formulate an intelligent policy of its own in the area. However
Japan's intentions are not entirely clear. Is Japan seeking to
pursue mercantilist policies in Southeast Asian markets by running
large trade surpluses similar to their surplus with the U.S.? Do
they hope to form a regional trading bloc to compete with and
eventually dominate NAFTA and the EC? Or worst of all is Japan
trying to thoroughly dominate S.E.,Asia by recreating the "Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" that eventually led to Pearl
Harbor and the Pacific War?
The fact that Japan runs an enormous trade surplus with the
U.S., and making their home market difficult for foreigners to
enter, has often led to the charge that Japan pursues a basically
mercantilist trade policy in the same vein as that of the
eighteenth century western trading nations. There are two
compelling reasons to believe this is not the case. First, the
Japanese are not stupid. If anything the Japanese are superb
students of history. They have built their nation into the power
it is by emulating that which works in the west and avoiding that
which does not. Why would they pursue a policy that was an abject
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historical failure? Second, the evidence does not bear it out.
True, Japan runs a large trade surplus with the U.S., and their
overall trade balance also shows a surplus. But, prior to the
current economic recession in Japan, 21 they did show a trade
deficit with many nations. Among Southeast Asian nations Japan *.ad
a trade deficit with Thailand and Indonesia, and virtually balanced
trade with Malaysia and the Philippines. 22  Furthermore, exports
from Southeast Asia to Japan do not consist entirely of raw
materials to be converted into manufactured goods and re-imported,
in the true mercantilirst tradition. In the 50's and 60's primary
commodities were their primary export but today more and more
Southeast Asian exports consist of labor and capital intensive
heavy industrial production. 23
With the European Community moving toward inward economic
union and outward protectionism, and the U.S. attempting to form
NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, Japan may be seeking to form a
similar bloc in S.E. Asia to protect themselves from possible
economic isolation. This is an extremely unlikely scenario for one
major reason; Japan needs the American market for its products and
will do whatever is necessary to ensure that market remains open.
The Japanese and American economies are so intertwined that to
21 The recession in Japan has weakened demand for imports
temporarily turning previous trade deficits into surpluses
22 Chung-in Moon, "Managing Regional Challenges: Japan, the
East Asian NICs and New Patterns of Economic Rivalry", Pacific
Focus, Fall 1991, 27
23 Moon, p. 33
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disrupt economic relations with a spasm of protectionism would be
devastating to both countries (admittedly more so for Japan since
the U.S. accounts for 46.4% of Japan's foreign investment) 24 . When
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed proposed the EAEC
excluding the U.S., Japan sided with Washington's objections and
agreed to encourage the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
which includes the U.S. 25 Without Japan or the U.S. there will be
no Asian-Pacific economic bloc of any significance. In addition
Japan has no reason to feel threatened by NAFTA since it does not
erect any new barriers to them, but simply lowers them among its
signees. Japan will be free to try to maintain their share of the
American market by competing with NAFTA signees. Forming their own
regional trading bloc in Asia would do nothing to help maintain
their American markets. If the Japanese lose an intolerable amount
of the U.S. market due to NAFTA they will have to make sonie
choices. They might attempt to set up something along the lines of
an EAEC and hope it can replace the lost American markets. If they
can persuade South Korea, Taiwan, and China to join, which would be
highly unlikely, they may have a chance. Another option will be to
join NAFTA (which any nation will be free to do by agreeing to its
provisions) and compete on a level playing field, which they would
24 Moon, p. 30. Also, Japan funds a large portion of the
U.S. national debt. A trade war would certainly result in Japan
ceasing to buy U.S. bonds, which would have a severe impact on
U.S. interest rates and, hence, the U.S. economy.
25 Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global Partners",
Foreign Policy, Spring 1992, p. 33
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probably be very successful at. They will have to open their
cherished home market to North American imports and this would be
a bitter pill to swallow. International trade is a very corplex
subject, but if anyone has mastered its nuances, Japan has. They
understand their past success and future prosperity is dependent on
their trade relationships, and their relationship with the U.S. is
by far the m)st important. The Japanese will go to great lengths
to avoid anything that might upset this relationship. The U.S.
economy would be hurt by a disruption in trade with Japan, but the
bottom line is Japan's economy would be devastated if not
destroyed. Japan will not attempt to shut the U.S. out of
Southeast Asia.
Those that believe Japan is trying to recreate the Greater
East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere would have us believe that not only
does Japan wish to pursue mercantilist trade policies but would be
willing to use military coercion to enforce their policy. This of
course would be intolerable to the U.S., China, both Koreas, and
Taiwan, not to mention ASEAN. Even the hint of increased Japanese
militarism draws strong reaction in S.E. Asia. 26  This puts Japan
in the middle of a very complex problem. They have legitimate
security interests in Southeast Asia and have a right to protect
26 The decision to send Japanese peace keepers into Cambodia
as part of the UN effort has caused some concern both in Japan
and in Southeast Asia. The forces they've sent have not been
cooperative with the UN and their performance has been less than
stellar. A single casualty caused a large uproar back in Japan.
If this relatively benign Japanese military presence has caused
so much concern imagine what a larger armed presence would cause.
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them with sufficient military forces if necessary. However, due to
lingering memories of WWII, other nations in the region are
naturally apprehensive about a militarily resurgent Japan.
Currently American military presence guarantees the security of
Japanese interests in the region so the dilemma can be avoided for
now. But if for any reason the U.S. guarantee was reduced or
removed a way will have to be found to allow Japan to provide for
her own security.
If Japan's economic ambitions in Southeast Asia are not
mercantilist or protectionist, what are their economic goals in the
region and how are they going about achieving them? Japan is
pursuing a policy of mutual benefit between ASEAN and themselves
and is doing it in a way that the U.S. should applaud, and perhaps
emulate. Japan and ASEAN have a number of mutual economic needs
that can be satisfied through trade, and given their geographic
proximity and cultural similarities it is natural they should be
close trading partners. It is no different than the reasons Canada
is the largest U.S. trade partner. 27  Specifically, Japan has a
labor shortage. Due to their rapid modernization and corresponding
increase in the standard of living, Japanese are no longer willing
to work in low paying, unskilled manufacturing jobs. As a modern
27 This is not to imply that Japan and Southeast Asia have
the same type of relationship as the U.S. and Canada. Canada's
economy is more advanced than the economies of Southeast Asia
resulting in a different kind of trade relationship. The point
is the fact that Canada is geographically close and culturally
similar to the U.S. merely makes any economic ties they would
have had with each other that much stronger.
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industrialized nation with few natural resources, Japan also needs
to import a large portion of their raw material needs, particularly
energy. Because of their reliance on imported raw materials, Japan
also has a strategic requirement to protect the vital sea lanes by
which these materials are transported. Southeast Asia plays a
large role in satisfying Japan's economic needs, and in return
Japan provides Southeast Asia with a market for their growing
export industries, direct investment to get those industries off
the ground, and aid to the lesser developed nations in the region.
Japan's economic policy toward Southeast Asia can be broken
down into three major components. These are; trade, investment,
and aid. Taken together they have sometimes been called Japan's
"comprehensive national security" policy. First proposed by Prime
Minister Ohira and formally introduced by Prime Minister Suzuki in
1980, Japan's policy of "comprehensive national security" has been
defined to extend beyond traditional military defense and alliance
structures to include reliable and affordable supplies of raw
materials and foodstuffs, unimpeded access to foreign markets for
Japanese merchandise and investment, and friendly stable
governments near Japan and astride crucial sea lanes connecting it
with its trade partners. 28
Japan's trade policy has been stereotyped as a one way
street. The Japanese work furiously, producing products in their
28 Steve Chan, "Humanitarianism, Mercantilism, or
Comprehensive National Security? Disbursement Patterns of
Japanese Foreign Aid", Asian Affairs: an American Review, Spring
1992, p. 6
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home factories to export to the rest of the world, ruthlessly
expanding market share, even by foregoing profits (dumping). At
the same time stiff protectionist barriers are raised at home to
prevent foreign competitors from selling many of their products in
Japan. Once Japan has destroyed all competition and is the sole
economic superpower, we will be at their mercy. In Southeast Asia
at least, the facts do not support this theory. As pointed out
earlier Japan runs a trade deficit with several ASEAN nations.
ASEAN as a group is heavily dependent on Japan for its exports. In
1991 36.9% of Indonesia's exports went to Japan. In Thailand the
figure was 17.7%, The Philippines 20.0%, Malaysia 16.0%, and
Singapore 8.5%.29 While ASEAN leaders sometimes complain about
Japanese protectionism and wish for more open access to Japan's
domestic markets they also have many positive things to say about
the relationship. Thai officials complain that they cannot produce
goods fast enough to export to Japan, and a Malaysian official
described his country's trade relationship with Japan as "a system
of mutual benefit". 30 Also, contrary to stereotypes, ASEAN exports
to Japan do not consist primarily of raw materials. True,
Indonesian oil does make up a large percentage of that countries
exports, but more and more of the regions's exports consist of
finished manufactures and capital intensive heavy industrial
29 Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1992, International Monetary
Fund
30 Michael Richardson, "Big Economic Role for Japan",
Pacific Defense Reporter, July 1989, p. 39
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production. 31  As the individual nations modernize and their
workforces become better skilled and educated they are moving
toward producing more high-tech products. Today ASEAN is where the
East Asian NIC's (S. Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) were twenty
years ago. Today the NIC's are considered serious threats by Japan
in the high-tech arena. 32  Ironically Japan is helping Southeast
Asia in its modernization just as they helped the NICs (through
patent rights, licenses, joint ventures, etc...). This is hardly
a picture of Japan as the economic predator often portrayed in the
United States. If the U.S. has cause for concern it is because we
are losing ground to the Japanese in S.E. Asian trade. In 1989
Japan overtook the U.S. as the leading export market for ASEAN. 33
The reason Japan has surpassed the U.S. in trade with ASEAN
is because 3f their investment strategy in the region. Since 1985
Japanese investment in Southeast Asia has outpaced the U.S. except
in the Philippines and Singapore.34 After the U.S. withdrawal from
the Philippines Japan will probably pass the U.S. economically
there also. In order to solve the labor shortage problem in their
home islands, Japan has moved much of the low-wage low-skill
manufacturing jobs offshore to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian
nations, hungry for foreign investment in their budding industries,
31 Moon, p. 41
32 Moon, p. 34
33 Richardson, p. 39
3 Moon, p. 28
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welcome such investment. Sectorally Japanese investment is divided
between manufacturing ($12.27 billion, in 1989), and commerce and
services ($11.90 billion) with resource development third ($7.3
billion). If Japan were seeking merely to exploit S.E. Asia for
its natural resources one would expect the resource development
figure to be much higher. MITI's claim, which looks highly
plausible when the record is examined, is that Japan's pattern of
investment is designed to improve the host countries' structural
trade deficits through export promotion, expand employment creation
in the host nations, enhance onsite supply of parts and components,
and improve competitive conditions of host countries through
transfer of technology and know-how.3 Through direct investment
Japan has undoubtedly become more influential in the economic
affairs of the region. As Southeast Asia becomes more reliant on
Japan for market outlets, capital, parts and components, and
technology they will be drawn more tightly into Japan's sphere of
economic influence.
Japanese foreign aid to Southeast Asia also demonstrates
their level of commitment to the region. What are Japan's motives
for giving aid? Does Japan give aid for purely humanitarian
reasons or is it given with strings attached as another way of
securing market dominance? In 1988 Japan passed the U.S. for the
first time as the world leader in developmental assistance to other
35 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 3, 1990, p. 48
3 Moon, p. 30
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nations ($10 billion vs. the U.S. $8.6 billion). 37  Most of that
assistance has been allocated to Asia of which ASEAN has been the
largest recipient. Some analysts characterize Japan's aid program
as simply another weapon in its mercantilist arsenal aimed at
foreign economic penetration in terms of both merchandise exports
and direct overseas investment. Naturally the Japanese themselves
do not admit to this. The official rationale for their aid program
was stated by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1978:
Instead of becoming a military power, we wish to contribute
our reserve power (resulting from moderate defense spending)
to the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world .... What I
wish to emphasize is that such a role of our country is
possible only with the existence of U.S.-Japanese cooperation
based on the U.S.-Japan security system. What Asian nations
expect from Japan is a contribution to peace as a non-military
power neighbor. I strongly hope that the American people will
understand this point correctly.?
Steve Chan's article published in the Spring 1992 issue of Asian
Affairs: an American Review points out that four of the top seven
nations receiving Japanese aid are ASEAN nations (the other three
being China, Mexico, and India) and in his conclusion he writes:
Neither the promotion of Japanese exports nor the search for
foreign resources shows a statistically significant impact on
the distribution pattern of Japan's official fund flows. In
contrast economic need.. .turns out to be the major determinant
of this distribution pattern. It appears that humanitarianism
37 Moon, p. 31. This number fluctuates annually with Japan
and the U.S. routinely switching back and forth as the world
leader. Before 1988 the U.S. was the undisputed leader in this
statistic.
38 Chan, p. 6
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has played a much more important role than has mercantilism in
this particular aspect of a prototypical "trading state".39
To state that Japan's aid program is based solely on a
humanitarian basis is a bit simplistic. Otherwise African nations
or India for example would receive more Japanese aid than they do.
So while humanitarianism plays a significant role, the Japanese
also take into account the potential return in their aid
"investment". Japan's economic policy toward Southeast Asia
clearly is designed to accommodate her legitimate national
interests. Japan takes advantage of the low cost labor supply to
help deal with a domestic labor shortage. Southeast Asia benefits
through the jobs provided. Japan is heavily dependent on imported
energy supplies. Most of their energy requirements either come
directly from Southeast Asia or pass through the region from the
Persian Gulf, so naturally Japan has a keen interest in maintaining
peace and stability in the area. Lacking the military capability
traditionally used for such purposes Japan uses the tools available
to her; trade, direct investment, and foreign aid reasoning that
prosperous neighbors are peaceful neighbors. As an insurance
policy Japan is quite content rely on U.S. military power to
maintain peace. Therefore, Japan and ASEAn will be content to
allow the role of the U.S. Navy in the region to continue.
However, in the post cold war era the U.S. is showing
increasing signs of reverting to a more isolationist foreign
39 Chan, p. 14
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policy. large military cutbacks are already in place and further
cuts are almost certain under the new administration. Japan may no
longer be able to count on as great a U.S. military insurance
policy in Southeast Asia, and some fear the Japanese will find it
necessary, if not iicesistible, to reassert themselves militarily
in the region. Is this a realistic possibility?; no, and for three
reasons.
First, the Asian-Pacific region is much different than it was
by the end of the 1930's. Then, Japan was by far the dominant
power both economically and militarily. China was divided by civil
war, Taiwan and Korea were already under Japanese rule, the Soviet
Union was preoccupied with Germany, as was Indonesia under Dutch
rule, and the two primary maritime colonial powers in Southeast
Asia, the British and French, kept the bulk of their maritime powcr
in European waters. The U.S. had a military presence in the
Philippines, but the bulk of its Pacific fleet was kept in Hawaii.
This U.S. fleet was a superior force to the Japanese Imperial Navy,
but in Washington the isolationists had the upper hand and the
fleet was kept at Pearl Harbor. Meanwhile the Japanese, in the
period between the world wars, had quietly built their Imperial
Navy into the dominant force in the region.
Today the circumstances are very different. The Chinese
navy, though much of their equipment is obsolete, is numerically
strong and is currently undergoing modernization. Even after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Pacific fleet is still
stronger by any measure than the Japanese Maritime Self Defense
42
Force.40  Of course it may be argued that the same thing was said
in 1905. Today there is one major difference. The Russians (and
the Chinese) have nuclear weapons and the Japanese do not. True,
the Japanese currently have the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but it is
doubtful that will still be in place in a situation if Japan finds
it necessary to pursue an adventuristic military policy. Today the
U.S. 7th Fleet is the dominant force, but if it were withdrawn
there would still be a solid maritime balance of power that did not
exist in the 19301s. This is an argument some might make for
withdrawing the 7th Fleet, however, this would leave the U.S. with
little influence over events and leave U.S. economic interests in
the hands of forces we could not control.
Second, the Japanese simply do not have the power projection
capability necessary to dominate Southeast Asia militarily nor
could they have any immediate plans to acquire it. Their current
force structure is designed to protect trade and patrol sea lanes
out to 1000 NM from the home islands. If Japan were to attempt to
project power into Southeast Asia they would need the capability to
control operations on, under, and over the sea, over 1000 NM from
Japan, for a protracted period. They would need the ability to
transport a large ground force, undertake an opposed landing, and
support those troops for an extended period. Japan currently has
no significant amphibious capability, no long range tactical air
capability (they are acquiring 10 tankers for air-to-air refueling
40 A.W. Grazebrook, "Maritime Potential No Cause for
Concern", Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1, 1991, p. 27
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but this is not nearly enough to sustain operations in Southeast
Asia), and no significant long range airlift capability.41
Third, the Japanese have expressed no willingness to re-
militarize their country. They refused direct military
participation in the Gulf War. Their democratic institutions make
it highly unlikely the Japanese people will ever allow militarists
to again gain control of the country. Prime Minister Kaifu, on a
tour of Southeast Asia in 1991, pledged Japan will use its economic
strength to play a more active role in Asia but will never again
become a military power threatening other countries. 42  Japan's
actions support that statement.
Still there is concern in Southeast Asia about the
possibility of a militarily resurgent Japan. Much is made of the
fact that Japan spends only one percent of its GNP on defense, but
its economy is so large that Japanese military spending ranks third
in the world behind only the U.S. and Russia. 43  Furthermore there
is a push among Japanese defense planners to increase the budget
beyond one percent in response to a perceived divergence in
security priorities between the U.S. and Japan for the first time
41 Grazebrook, p. 28
42 Michael Richardson, "Japan Pledges Peaceful Cooperation",
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1991, p. 12. PM Kaifu is not
alone. PMs Ozawa and Nakasone have made similar statements.
There is a more militaristic right wing in Japanese politics but
so far they have had little real influence
43 Michael Richardson, "Superpower detente raises fear of
Japan", Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1990, p. 17
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since 1945." Russian intransigence over the Kurile Islands is
another factor given as a reason Japan may enhance the capabilities
of its defence force. Other developments that may prompt Japan to
develop a true power projection capability include a drastic
withdrawal of U.S. forces, "unacceptable" trade barriers erected by
the U.S. and/or the E.C., or war on the Korean Peninsula.45
There is still some degree of mistrust in Southeast Asia of
the Japanese left over from their occupation in WWII. Lee Kuan Yew
of Singapore describes allowing Japan a military role in peace-
keeping activities as like "giving liqueur chocolates to an
alcoholic", that the drive to be "number one" in whatever Japan did
was part of Japanese culture, "whatever they do, they go to its
limits", and "there is an underlying unease" about Japan in Asia. 4 6
This mistrust of the Japanese is one reason why ASEAN (as well as
China and non-ASEAN Southeast Asian states) still desires a U.S.
military presence in the region.
Japan has a vital interest in maintaining peace and security
in Southeast Asia. Currently the U.S.-Japan security treaty and
the American military presence provides the Japanese with the
assurance they need that their interests will be protected. If the
Japanese feel they no longer have that assurance it is not
" Gwen Robinson, "Defence Planners Uneasy", Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter, August 1991, p. 16. Japanese defense spending
may in fact already be above 1% of GNP depending on how the
accounting is done.
45 Richardson, "Superpower Detente...", p. 18
46 Richardson, "Japan Pledges...", pp. 12-13
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unreasonable tu expect them to move to protect their interests
themselves. However it would take time for Japan to acquire the
necessary military capabilities and the U.S. would have plenty of
time to react. What should the U.S. reaction be ii Japan rearms?
That would depend on what events precipitated Japan's actions. If
there is no fundamental change in the security arrangements in the
region, i.e. the U.S. remains engaged and makes no attempts to
economically isolate Japan through trade barriers, and Japan begins
building a large amphibious capability and long range tactical air
capability, then a strong reaction will be required. Given the
united opposition in the region to a militarily resurgent Japan, it
would not be difficult to bring sufficient pressure to bear on
Japan to cease the buildup. This scenario is highly unlikely. If,
however, the U.S. completely withdraws from the region, leaving
Japan's vital interests unprotected, the U.S. must expect Japan to
take steps to protect those interests. Other actors in the region
can also be expected to take steps in reaction to this change in
the balance of power. The Chinese, the Russians, and the ASEAN
nations will probably find it necessary to step up their military
spending. The Japanese will probably never be able to achieve the
dominant position they had prior to the beginning of WWI147 so the
result may be a relatively stable new balance of power arrangement
47 Some may argue that the U.S. was the dominant force in
the Pacific at the time. Had the American fleet at Pearl Harbor
been actively engaged in the region by patrolling Southeast Asian
waters, instead of staying tied up at the piers in Hawaii, this
would have been true. Perhaps Japanese aggressiveness would have
been tempered by a stronger U.S. military presence.
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in East Asia without the U.S. Some may see this as a desirable
outcome since the U.S. will no longer be footing the defense bill
for Japan. The result may also be a destabilizing arms race, or an
unstable and potentially volatile balance of power similar to
Europe before the World Wars, which clearly would not be in the
best interest of the U.S. Either way the U.S. would have very
little say in the outcome.
It is difficult to find fault with Japan's economic policies
in Southeast Asia. An economic giant, they are an island nation
with few natural resources heavily dependent on foreign trade.
Their vulnerability is further exposed by a lack of strong military
capability to protect their interests. Japan's situation could be
compared to Great Britain one hundred years ago minus the Royal
Navy. In the absence of dominant military power, Japan has found
it advisable to construct its economic relationships in such a way
as to ensure that its trading partners find it in their own best
interest to maintain close and peaceful relations with Japan. This
is what has been characterized as "economic imperialism" by Japan's
critics, but the nations of Southeast Asia have benefitted from
Japan's policies there. Though the relationship isn't completely
satisfactory to all the Southeast Asian leaders, and vocal
criticism of Japan's relatively closed markets are increasing, in
general Southeast Asia approves of Japanese investment and trade in
the region. Southeast Asia contains some of the fastest growing
states in the world and they have been helped by Japan. Given
their geographic proximity and cultural similarities this
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relationship is natural. The same situation is present between the
U.S. and its neighbors. This is not to say the U.S. should give up
on Southeast Asia. American companies have considerable
investments in the region and as it modernizes the market for
American made goods should also increase. Though the U.S. stake in
Southeast Asia may not be as great as Japan's it still is a strong
economic interest of the U.S. and should not be abandoned. Peace
and stability in the region is clearly in the U.S. national
interest and the required naval presence should be maintained.
2. China
China's relations with Southeast Asia are more problematical.
Chinese interests in the region can be divided into two parts;
economic and s-rategic. The domestic situation in China is
unpredictable and changes at home will affect their foreign policy,
but for the near future it is safe to assume China will continue to
pursue the same policies of the past few years. China's national
interests are no different than those of any other nation
attempting to cope and compete in today's post-Cold War
international climate. Their first priority must be domestic
political stability, i.e. the CCP maintaining power for the
preservation of law and order. The Chinese Communist Party still
rules and if they are to continue to rule they must keep the
population satisfied. To achieve this the CCP must meet the
growing economic expectations of the people. Economic growth is
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the next priority for China and from this stems the third priority;
regional stability.
Southeast Asia's position on China's southern flank makes the
region important to their national interest. Stability in, and
trade with, Southeast Asia are important components of the Chinese
national interest. How the Chinese pursue their interests in
Southeast Asia will have a direct affect on U.S. national interests
in the region.
The first component of Chinese relations with Southeast Asia
is economic. At the top of their interest is the welfare and
protection of the overseas Chinese. China has put much emphasis on
liberalizing their economy, expanding growth, and integrating
itself into the global economy. The success , the Southeast
Asian economies is well known. One would think these circumstances
would result in exploding trade between the two, but it is not the
case. In 1991 Trade between China and .,SEAN was only accounted for
4.9% of China's total trade and 2.3% of ASEAN's total trade.' 8 Why
is this the case?
The main reason is that the two economies are too similar and
do not have many comparative advantages to offer each other. Both
are in the relatively early stages of development. Exports for
both consist mostly of traditional commodity items and natural
resources, and imports are mostly modern capital goods. As with
ASEAN, the industrial countries play a major role in Chinese
48 Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1992. Data used was the
most recent available; from Q4 1991 through Q3 of 1992
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foreign trade. Since 1975 the industrial countries provided 61% of
imports and took 40% of exports from China. Adding in trade with
Hong Kong both numbers increase to 70 percent.49  ASEAN's natural
resource exports include petroleum, lumber, rubber, palm oil, non-
ferrous metals (mostly tin), coffee, and rice. Of these China
itself has exported petroleum, palm oil, tin, and rice. 50  Since
the Chinese don't drink much coffee, that leaves lumber and rubber
as the only candidates for increased imports from ASEAN. It is
possible that China will become an importer of oil from Southeast
Asia as their domestic reserves are depleted and domestic demand
increases.
China's policies in the Spratly islands may be a sign of
their increasing anxiety over petroleum supplies. In short, until
both Southeast Asian and Chinese economies become more fully
developed the prospect for increased trade between the two is
limited. China will not be an economic competitor for the U.S. in
Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future but could pose a threat
to U.S. strate--c interests if they were to be adjudged guilty of
aggression in the Spratly Islands.
The Spratly Islands is certainly the most serious potential
flashpoint in Southeast Asia. This island chain sits in the middle
of the South China Sea stretching from about 600 miles south of
49 Fred Herschede, "Trade Between China and ASEAN: the
Impact of the Pacific Rim Area", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2,
Summer 1991, p. 183
50 Herschede, p. 185
50
China's coast nearly to Brunei. Little more than an archipelago of
sand bars and reefs it was thought until recently to be of little
economic value. The dispute between Vietnam and China over the
Spratlys as well as the Paracel Islands to the north goes back
nearly a century. After the first oil shock in the early 1970s oil
companies began searching for new sources of oil. The Spratly and
Paracel Islands suddenly became much more important. South Vietnam
signed exploration contracts with U.S. companies and quietly
garrisoned some of the Paracels. China boldly reasserted its claim
on the islands and sent an eleven ship naval flotilla to the area.
After a clash that sank one Vietnamese ship and sent four others
limping home China had control of the Paracels and South Vietnam
was powerless to stop them. Hanoi quickly sided with their
communist allies while both Taiwan and the Philippines announced
they were the rightful owners. The U.S. 7th fleet remained
neutral.
Vietnam continued to occupy several of the Spratly islands
despite Chinese claims that the entire South China Sea was Chinese
territory. However there was no further armed conflict until 1988
when another Chinese naval flotilla sank three Vietnamese ships,
killed 72 seamen, and took nine prisoners. 51 The result was China
seizing six islands from Vietnam. Again the 7th Fleet remained
neutral as did the Soviet warships operating from Cam Ranh Bay.
Today China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan occupy
51 "Treacherous Shoals", Far Eastern Economic Review, August
13, 1992, p. 15
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islands in the Spratly chain. Brunei occupies no islands and only
claims territorial waters over part of the area.
Since the first mention of the possibility oil underneath the
Spratlys in the early 1970s, it has remained just that - a
possibility. To date no oil or natural gas has been found. The
only information is based on geological studies that suggest the
region has potential. China is the only nation that has
demonstrated a willingness to use offensive action to assert its
claims. The others are more willing to settle the dispute through
negotiation or joint development.
China's motives in the Spratlys are difficult to discern.
The prospects for oil are the most common reasons given for China's
aggressiveness in asserting its claims. China has been able to
satisfy its oil demand with domestic sources but this is rapidly
changing. In 1985 Oil accounted for 27% of Chinese exports, but in
1991 only 5%.52 As China's economy continues to grow so will their
demand for oil. China will soon be an oil importer and may see the
potential oil in the South China Sea as a way to prevent or at
least postpone their dependence on imported oil.
Other possible motives are less comforting. China may be
trying to assert itself as a regional hegemon. A 1992 Rand report
on new postures for American forces in Asia states that China will
52 ibid, p. 16
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continue to be viewed by Southeast Asian states as the primary long
term threat to Southeast Asia. Four reasons are given: 53
Its geographic proximity and past history of interference in
Southeast Asian affairs.
Its past exploitation of the large ethnic Chinese populations in
many Southeast Asian states to foment internal unrest.
Continued Chinese dissatisfaction over the territorial status
quo.
The resurgence of a hard-line leadership in Beijing after the
Tiananmen incident of June 1989.
If the Chinese gain control of the entire Spratly chain they
will be able to dominate the entire South China Sea including the
sea lanes that carry the oil from the Middle East as well as all
the shipping between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia (Japan and
Korea). Today there is no reason to believe China wishes to
disrupt these sea lanes, but their gaining the ability to do so
should be worrisome to the United States. In defense of China, the
same consideration for China's position in Southeast Asia must be
given as the United States expects when third powers strike deals
with central America. A strong American naval presence in the
South China Sea, continually asserting the right to transit through
the area freely will send a strong message to the Chinese that the
U.S. will not tolerate any restriction of such transit. If there
are further clashes amongst the claimants to the Spratlys the U.S.
navy will not and should not become involved. The issue of who has
53 "A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific
Dimension", RAND, Santa Monica, 1992, pp. 66-67
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legitimate sovereignty of the islands is complex and should be
settled by the parties involved, preferably through negotiation.
The U.S. choosing sides will only encourage whichever side we
support to take unilateral action and possibly draw the U.S. into
a conflict with China. Ownership of the islands is not what is
critical to the U.S. It is the right to freely transit the area
that is critical and ensuring that right is the proper role for the
U.S. Navy.
C. EAZC, AFTA, AND NAFTA: REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS - THREAT OR
ASSET?
In recent years there has been much speculation that the
world is dividing into trading blocs: the European Community, North
America, and East Asia. The ever increasing possibility that the
Uruguay round of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
talks will not be successfully concluded lend credence to this
possibility. The EC is already an organized bloc, but the North
American and East Asian blocs are not yet certain to form.
NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, negotiated and
signed by former-President Bush, would unite the U.S., Canada, and
Mexico into a free trade area. The agre3ment faces several hurdles
before it can take effect. The Clinton administration is insisting
on attaching additional agreements on environmental and wage
standards. The U.S. Congress may not approve NAFTA with or without
the additional agreements. Canada has not been enthusiastic about
NAFTA from the start.
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The possibility of an East Asian economic bloc is even
further on the horizon. Several concepts for organizing East Asia
into some form of economic union have been proposed, and some have
been tentatively adopted, but none of them (an be fully
characterized as a trade bloc on the scale of the EC. The East
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), originally called the East Asian
Economic Group, is the most controversial. Proposed by Malaysia's
Prime Minister Mahathir, it was to include the ASEAN nations plus
China, Hong Kong, Japan, S. Korea, and Taiwan. Pointedly, the
United States, Canada, and Australia were excluded. U.S. pressure
on Japan to not support the plan forced Mahathir to modify his
proposal from a trading bloc to merely a consultative forum.
The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum does
include the U.S., Canada, and Australia. AaL.tionally Mexico,
Chile, Ecuador, and Russia have applied for membership. 5 4 Formed
in 1989 APEC does not envisage any preferential free-trade
arrangement as in NAFTA. The U.S. sees APEC as a key vehicle for
sustaining market oriented development, advancing regional and
global trade liberalization, and fostering a more prosperous
economic future for the entire Asia-Pacific region. 55 It has been
compared to the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development), an innocuous caucus of countries exchanging
54 Shim Jae Hoon, "Growing up Pains", Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 14, 1991, p. 27
"secretary of State James Baker in a statement at the
ASEAN post-ministerial conference, Manila, Philippines, July 26,
1992
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statistics and information, or the G-7.6 It too is simply a
consultative forum.




Brunei X X X
Canada X
China X X
Hong Kong X X
Indonesia X X X
Japan X X
S. Korea X X
Malaysia X X X
New Zealand X
Philippines X X X
Singapore X X X
Taiwan X X
Thailand X X X
U.S. I _II x
The Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) consists only of the ASEAN
countries. Possibly the most significant step towards true
economic integration since the ASEAN's inception in 1967, AFTA has
many limitations. The plan is to be implemented over a fifteen
year period, but the agreement is hedged with so many
56 ibid, p. 27
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qualifications there is serious doubt it will have any real impact.
There is a clause that allows any member to opt out of certain
parts of the accord if the member felt it would harm its domestic
industry. Agricultural and services industries were left out
entirely. The AFTA agreement reflects one of ASEAN's biggest
failures: the inability to establish meaningful economic
cooperation.
If ASEAN or any other combination of East Asian countries
were to form a trade bloc it would have an effect on the U.S.
economically. Just how much of an effect is debatable. Naturally
the most important factors are whether or not the United States is
included and to what extent an East Asian bloc would come under
the domination of Japan. If a bloc is formed along EAEC lines it
could be damaging to U.S. interests. If it is formed along APEC
lines it would be beneficial to the United States. Even an EAEC-
based bloc would not be particularly damaging if it did not raise
protectionist barriers to non-members. If, similar to NAFTA, it
only reduced tariffs and other barriers to member nations without
actively raising barriers to non-member nations (as the EC does)
the effect on the United States would be negligible. In fact it
would make it easier for the United States to negotiate a free
trade agreement with an EAEC as a whole, rather than trying to
negotiate with each nation separately. Due to the importance of
the American market to Asian products it is unlikely a
protectionist trade bloc will form excluding the United States.
The stalled GATT talks are increasing the possibility of the
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world dividing into regional trading blocs, and there is some
debate on whether this is a positive development or not. The GATT
movement, under the leadership of the United States since the end
of WWII, is in large part responsible for the explosion in
international trade of the last 45 years. By drastically reducing
tariffs and other barriers to trade GATT has been greatly
responsible for the rapid economic recovery from WWII and the
subsequent rapid increase in the standard of living of
participating nations. If the stalled Uruguay Round of the GATT
negotiations could be successfully completed further economic gains
would be realized. If the negotiations fail, there is a risk of
backsliding to the protectionism and trade wars that characterized
the depression years of the 1930s.
Some argue that if GATT fails, regional free-trade areas are
the next best thing. The next logical step would be to negotiate
free-trade pacts between blocs with the end result approaching
global free trade. The opposite argument is that blocs would tend
to erect rrotect~onist ba-riers touching off trade wars, thus
leading to a slowing of the global economy. Roger Porter, former
Assistant to the U.S. President for Economic and Domestic Policy
endorses the former argument:
Fears of protectionist regional blocs - a fortress Europe, a
Fortress America, and a Fortress Asia - are easy to
understand. But they will prove unfounded. ... Past
experience demonstrates that regional economic arrangements
can complement a strong multilateral trading system and
increase global trade flows. Four decades ago, under the
Marshall Plan, the U.S. welcomed proposals...for a European
Common Market, secure in the belief it could be achieved on
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terms that would promote increased trade with outsiders.
History has proven that judgement correct.5 7
Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon takes the
opposite view. Commenting on Mahathir's proposed EAEC he said;
We are still opposed to the idea of regional trading
blocs...because we think it will end up suppressing, rather
than encouraging, the further expansion of international
trade. 58
Puzzling as it may be, both these persons presumably speak
,or the official position of the American administration, yet they
express exactly opposite ideas.
The prospects for the world dividing into three trade blocs
do not appear to be imminent. True, the European bloc is already
in place. But NAFTA, once considered a sure thing, now is less
definite. The longer the agreement remains unratified by Congress,
the less likely it ever will be. Even if it is finally ratified
and implemented, it contains no protectionist barriers to non-
members. The only harm to outsiders would be a natural shifting of
trade to those nations included in the pact because of the
decreased tariffs. Non-members would be free to try to recoup the
lost trade by becoming more competitive. No artificial barriers
would stand in their way. In fact China and Japan are already
making investments in Mexico in anticipation of NAFTA being passed,
allowing them to use Mexico as a side door for getting their
57 Roger Porter, "Fortress Fears Unfounded", Far Eastern
Economic Review, November 21, 1991, p. 27
58 Susumu Awanohara, "A three-region world?", Far Eastern
Economic Review, January 31, 1991, p. 33
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products into the United States. It can thus be seen that NAFTA,
by fostering more economic growth in North America, could actually
result in more, not less, trans-Pacific trade.
The likelihood of an Asian trade bloc that excludes the
United States is very small. The American market is simply too
important to the Asian economies: U.S. trade with Asia sul2assed
trade with Europe more than a decade ago. It is now over one third
larger. 59 The U.S. market accounts for 30% of East Asia's exports
(compared to the EC's 15%). America accounts for almost twice as
many East Asian exports as Japan. 0  Japan cannot replace the
American market for East Asia's goods, as some argue. The world
economy has become too internationalized to make protecticnist
trading blocs a realistic possibility. Especially for the
developing economies of Asia, that are dependant on trade and
foreign investment for their continued development, a breakdown in
global free trade would be disastrous. This is why a universal
trade system like GATT is crucial. If North America, for some
reason, decided to erect a wall of protectionist barriers around
its economies, Asia would be forced to do the same. It would
likely be centered around Japan and constructed on a framework
similar to the EAEC. Such a development would be disastrous for
Japan as well as all the export-oriented Asian economies. While
the United States would not be hurt quite as much, it clearly would
59 Porter, p. 27
6 Nigel Holloway, "An Insurance Policy", Far Eastern
Economic Review, July 25, 1991, p. 52
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be damaging and is not in the national interest. If the Asians
were to form a non-protectionist free-trade area similar to NAFTA
it would not necessarily be considered a threat to U.S. interests.
It would all depend on the conditions imposed on trade with non-
bloc members, and whether the United States were to be admitted as
a member of the bloc. Whether any type of bloc is formulated in
Southeast Asia makes no difference so far as the presence of the
U.S. Navy in Southeast Asian waters is concerned. Bloc or no bloc,
sea borne traffic demands naval protection, and the best instrument
for that protection is the continuing presence of the American
Navy. This is recognized by all the nation states in the region.
It just stands to reason that if any bloc is formed, it is common
sense not to exclude or alienate the Americans. This explains why
Mahathir has never made any significant progress with his Economic
Caucus -- he proposed to slam the door against the Americans and
the Japanese as well. Continued U.S. naval presence in the region
will serve as a reminder to Asian nations of the value of including
America in any trade bloc. A withdrawal of American presence would
only serve to decrease America's value to the region.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. PROBLEM OF HOW MUCH NAVY I8 ENOUGH
Determining precisely the level of naval presence required
in Southeast Asia is a difficult task. It is largely a subjective
question dependent on a continual fluctuation in the level of
threat perception. It is important to maintain a force level
sufficient to have a deterrent effect, not just enough to
accomplish a specific mission. It is difficult to know just how
much is enough to deter a potential enemy without overdoing it,
thus running the risk of increasing resentment and hostility toward
the United States. As of this writing (mid-1993)we are reducing
even our regional presence in the light of domestic fiscal
restraints. We must however maintain enough presence to assure all
the people in the region the United States is still committed to
peace and stability in Southeast Asia.
During the Cold War U.S. deployments in the Western Pacific
typically featured two carrier battle groups (CVBG) and a
battleship surface action group (BBSAG). Post-Cold War military
budgets will necessarily reduce this level of presence, and
justifiably so. Power projection into the Middle East is the one
remaining interest that could justify a naval presence of this
magnitude, but it is not realistic to expect to keep such a
powerful force on station at all times. Not even the existing
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level of tension in the Middle East can justify the current size of
our Navy.
Preventing the rise of a regional hegemon is a theoretic role
that could require a large naval presence. Practically at the
present time a single CVBG and a few attack submarines should be
enough to handle the largest regional navy (the Chinese) that could
in any way be considered a threat to become a regional hegomonic
power.
Other naval missions in support of U.S. interests such as
keeping the SLOCs in the South China Sea leading to the Indian
Ocean open, (exercising freedom of navigation, promoting and
protecting U.S. commerce, and protecting U.S. citizens abroad) can
be accomplished with forces smaller than a CVBG. The nature of new
threats since the practical disappearance of the Russian fleet from
the Western Pacific demands a new calculus for determining our
naval requirements in that region. The loss of Subic Bay only
accentuates the need for reassessment of numbers, types, and
deployments of ships in Southeast Asia, and all such calculations
can be worked out in diplomatic consultation with all the powers
resident in the region, not just our "friends and allies".
B. COPING WITH THE LOSS OF SUBIC
Clark airbase in the Philippines was formally turned over to
the Philippine government in November of 1991. The U.S. Navy was
out of Subic Navy Base and Cubi Point Naval Air Station by the end
of 1992. These facilities were invaluable to the United States
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because of their geographic location and the availability of all
major training and logistics functions at a single site. These
functions can not be replicated at any single site in Southeast
Asia.
However, this will not nave a crippling effect on U.S. naval
operations in the region. As stated in A StrateQic Framework for
the Pacific Rim; "Our Departure from Subic will not result in a
reduction in afloat operations by the 7th Fleet or shrinkage in the
number of ships operating in the Western Pacific. The size of the
Pacific Fleet is determined by maritime interests in the Pacific,
not by our access to Subic Bay"(p. 14).
In some respects the loss of the Philippine bases may turn
out to be a blessing. The Navy will now more likely be calling on
more ports in more countries than in the past. Commercial ship
repair facilities throughout the region will be used on a greater
scale. This will help to spread more U.S. good will, as well as
dollars, more evenly throughout the region. By having the
Philippines ask us to leave, instead of the United States deciding
on its own to close expensive overseas facilities that may no
longer be needed, the United States was spared the appearance of
abandoning an old ally as well as the region in general.
One area where the loss of the Philippine bases could hurt
the United States is in power projection to the Middle East. The
storage facilities at Subic and Clark were useful in supplying the
rapid response forces that were sent to the Persian Gulf at the
outset of Desert Shield. The Crow Valley training facilities were
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also important in training U.S. aircrews for Desert Storm.
However, the Philippine government did express some concern (but
they did not object) about the safety of some of their citizens in
the Middle East as a result of allowing the United States to use
their facilities to fight the war in the Gulf. 61 It would be nice
if all base facilities for protecting Pacific approaches to the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf were located in U.S. territory, but
the simple fact is that the world is too big and the needs of the
Navy too extensive. Currently the closest facilities are in
Hawaii, which considerably slows the response time to any critical
threat in those areas. Storage facilities could be constructed a
little closer on Guam, but with the current budget austerity this
is not likely to happen soon.
C. THE CASE AGAINST U.S. WITHDRAWAL
A lessening of American naval presence may be inevitable, but
a total withdrawal could be disastrous. It could easily spark a
destabilizing regional naval arms race. Furthermore the presence
of the U.S. 7th Fleet provides a buffer to expanding Chinese naval
power as well as a brake on a potential future Japanese naval
threat. This is a source of comfort and security to Southeast
Asian nations. Any sign of a drastic reduction of security
commitment to the region would in all likelihood result in an
61 Sheldon Simon, "U.S. Interests and Future Military
Presence in Southeast Asia", Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, p. 12
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unwarranted step-up in military spending by the nations in the
region.
Regional navies already have a limited power projection
capability and some are expanding and modernizing. Among the naval
powers in the South China Sea are: 62
1. China
The Chinese navy is not a world class power but it is the
largest and most sophisticated navy in Southeast Asia. Currently
they have 45 major surface combatants6 and over 100 submarines.
New classes of destroyers and frigates are being built at the
Shanghai shipyards, and China has long term plans to acquire
aircraft carriers. The Chinese have a proven ability to keep a
naval task force at sea for at least thirty days. They are
upgrading a marine brigade and have the ability to transport and
land large numbers of PLA troops. China recently purchase a
squadron of 24 long-range SU27 fighters from Moscow reportedly to
be based in the Paracels.6
Although much of China's naval inventory is aging and
obsolete, it is still the most capable force in the South China
Sea. However, it would be no match for the U.S. 7th Fleet, and is
6 Conboy, pp. 8-9. All naval strength figures are from
here unless otherwise footnoted.
6 frigate-size or larger
64 Tai Ming Cheung, "Fangs of the Dragon", Far Eastern
Economic Review, August 13, 1992, p. 20
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likewise no match for Japan. In terms of world power the Chinese
Navy is no threat to dominate the region.
2. Thailand
Although Thailand is not part of the territorial dispute in
the South China Sea, its navy has been undergoing an ambitious
modernization program. Recent acquisitions include three
indigenous-built anti-submarine corvettes, four Chines-made
frigates with helicopter decks. Discussions are currently underway
to purchase from the U.S. four Knox-class frigates, and thirty A-7E
aircraft to form a naval air wing. Thailand also maintains a
Marine Corps and Navy SEAL commandos. Future plans include a
German-built helicopter support ship that can carry Harrier V/STOL
aircraft. This too is tiny in terms of world power.
3. Malaysia
Like Thailand, Malaysia is undergoing an extensive naval
modernization program. They have contracted to buy two British
corvettes and are seeking to buy four diesel submarines from
Sweden. Moscow has offered to sell Malaysia forty sophisticated
MiG29 fighter aircraft at favorable prices. 65  If Malaysia gets
everything it wants, it still is in no position to meet any
challenge at sea except a challenge from one of its neighbors.
4. The Philippines
The Philippine Navy is the least capable regional navy for
projecting power into the South China Sea. Internal insurgency has
65 Cheung, p. 20
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resulted in most of their maritime forces being committed to
coastal defense and riverine operations. Manila has announced
plans to buy three missile boats from Spain, and three other
gunboats from Australia. The fact of the matter is that the
Philippine Navy is in such miserable shape, that they congratulate
themselves when their ships are able to put to sea. Interestingly,
The Philippines claims that its 1951 mutual defense agreement with
the U.S. extends to their claims on the Spratlys. The U.S.
disagrees.
5. Vietnam
In terms of numbers Vietnam has the largest navy in Southeast
Asia. However, the numbers alone are misleading as much of their
navy is obsolete or unserviceable. Much of what was acquired from
South Vietnam is obsolete, and there is no longer any military
assistance coming from the Soviet Union. Economic pressures are
forcing Hanoi to further reduce military spending.
As Southeast Asian nations, particularly the ASEAN countries,
become more prosperous they will have the means to purchase (or
manufacture) more sophisticated weapons in greater numbers.
Maritime trade is of particular importance to the countries of the
region and the means to protect that trade is perceived to be a
necessity, but it will be a long time until any local nation can
provide any semblance of that protection on their own. As long as
the United States maintains a strong naval presence, Southeast
Asian nations will not feel compelled to strive for unlimited naval
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power. Chinese military assertiveness in the Spratlys as well as
other territorial disputes between countries of the region can
provide the spark that may result in future conflict. The U.S. 7th
Fleet is by far the most powerful force in the western Pacific and
its continued presence will serve as an assurance to the region
that stability will be maintained. This assurance will temper the
naval arms race and minimize any disruptive conflicts either by
China, Japan or one of the Southeast Asian nations.
D. CONCLUSION
The U.S. already has a significant commercial presence in
South East Asia and it can be expected to grow in the future.
Associated with this presence there are a large number of
Americans living and working in the region. It is a basic
obligation of the U.S. government to protect these Americans and
any legitimate commercial interests Americans have in the region.
It has always been a traditional role of the Navy to fulfill this
obligation.
The free flow of oil from the Middle East through
international waters, including the Strait of Malacca, to the
United States and other nations is a vital interest of the United
States. This flow of oil must be guaranteed if the industrialized
economies of the world are to continue to function. The Navy is
the force most capable of guaranteeing freedom of navigation and
access to ensure the flow of oil continues once it leaves the Gulf.
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Finally, stability in Southeast Asia is vital if the above
mentioned interests are to remain unthreatened. The reassurance
the nations of the region gather from a strong U.S. naval presence
is essential if they are to continue to focus on their own
continuing economic and political development. Any potentially
unfriendly outside power with hegemonic ambitions in Southeast Asia
must be made to recognize that the United States is willing and
prepared to defend its interests in the region by whatever means
necessary.
If peace and stability in Southeast Asia can be maintained,
economic prosperity, and the development of democratic governments
that respect basic human rights can continue. This is surely in
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